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Abstract.– Building on Giraud & Tsomocos (2009), we develop
a model of nonequilibrium trades with incomplete markets. Out-
of-equilibrium trades occur in continuous time, both on inter-
national and domestic markets. Traders are assumed to exhibit
locally rational expectations on future prices, interest rates and
exchange rates. Although currencies turn out to be non-neutral,
if their stock grows sufficiently rapidly and if agents can trade
assets during a sufficiently long period, the world economy con-
verges in probability towards some interim constrained efficient
state. Moreover, a random localized version of the Quantity The-
ory of Money holds provided the economy is not trapped in a
liquidity hole. The traditional theory of comparative advantages,
however, turns out to be challenged by international capital mo-
bility.
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1 Introduction
This paper is part of a programme to verify whether it is possible to ob-
tain a micro-economically founded dynamics of out-of-equilibrium monetary
trades with heterogeneous boundedly rational agents that enables to explain
the main phenomena observed in economic applications — and which yet
cannot be explained within standard general equilibrium theory or only on
ad hoc grounds.
This programme started with Giraud & Tsomocos (2009).1 There, trade
paths (i.e., orbits of our dynamics) were shown to converge to some locally
Pareto-optimal point provided the quantity of inside money injected by the
Central Bank grows sufficiently rapidly. Otherwise, the economy enters into
a liquidity trap from which it can be saved only by a massive injection of
money. Money was shown to be non-neutral (both in the short- and in
the long-run), although a localized version of the quantity theory of money
could be deduced. The consequence was that, whenever the quantity of
injected money increases more rapidly than its optimal growth rate, this has
no impact on the real economy, and produces only additional inflation. By
contrast with Friedman’s “golden rule”, however, this optimal growth rate
of money heavily depends upon the real characteristics of the economy. In
particular, it depends on local gains-to-trade available at each point of time.
There were three major restrictions in the above mentioned paper: We
restricted ourselves to complete markets and to national trades within a single
country with a unique currency. In addition, no saving account was available
where cash could be stored. The aim of the present paper is to extend
our analysis to the case of international trades with incomplete markets,
various currencies, national saving accounts, and heterogeneous households
within each country. To simplify the presentation, we have introduced these
new ingredients step by step. Sections 2 and 3 deal with incomplete barter
markets. International trades, currencies and saving accounts are treated
from section 4 on.
The dynamics is based on the continuous double auction, which is prob-
ably the most widely used price formation mechanism in modern financial
markets. In a continuous-time setting, traders (buyers and sellers) are al-
lowed to place or cancel trading orders whenever they like, at the prices of
their choice. If an order to buy meets an order to sell, there is a transaction.2
The specific micro-structure used in this paper is Mertens’ (2003) limit-price
mechanism.3
As appealing as it may be, however, empirical tests of the continuous
1Of course, there are many predecessors: the whole macro-economic literature of the
70s, devoted to disequilibrium theory (see, e.g., Herings (1996) for a synthesis), Smale
(1976), Fisher (1983), Champsaur & Cornet (1990) for the dynamical aspects; Dubey &
Geanakoplos (2003) for the treatment of money.
2See, e.g., Glosten & Milgrom (1985).
3see Giraud (2003) for the link between this mechanism, double auctions and strategic
market games.
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double auction show that it does not match reality very well.4 This is partly
the reason why double auctions on markets populated by traders with a “low
level of intelligence” were developped, and turn out to fit data much more
accurately. Such models assume that agents place orders more or less at ran-
dom.5 Here, following Giraud & Tsomocos (2009),6 we assumed instead that
traders are myopic in the following sense: 1) Instead of heroically solving the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation associated to his intertemporal optimiza-
tion programme, each individual simply seeks to maximize the first-order
linear approximation of his current utility. 2) Households entertain expecta-
tions about the distant future that may not coincide with perfect forecast.
These expectations are reflected through the saving behavior of agents. One
consequence of the postulated myopia of traders is that they continuously
trade (adjusting their portfolio and commodity bundle according to their
current utility gradient). This is in accordance with the well-known empiri-
cal observation that, on average, investors trade much more than they should
according to standard equilibrium theory.7 Global trading in financial mar-
kets is of an order of hundred times as large as global production.8
Our paradigm includes (possibly incomplete) markets of multiple finan-
cial assets (to allow for a study of relative price changes), heterogeneous
households in each country, trade in continuous time in multiple currencies,
riskless bonds, and national monetary policies conducted by budget-balanced
Central Banks. Hahn’s (1965) standard puzzle regarding the value of money
is solved in a way similar to Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003): as long as
there are effective trades along a solution path to our dynamics, money has
a positive value (due to a cash-in-advance constraint a la Clower (1967)).
However, as soon as the amount of inside money injected at some time t by
the Central Bank in of each country is lower than a certain threshold (which
depends upon the amount of outside money and the potential, local gains to
trade available within the country9), then the world economy breaks down
in a liquidity hole: Trades collapse, prices become indeterminate, and money
has no more value. The surprising lessons to be drawn from this property are
that 1) money is not neutral in our model ; 2) the collapse of the whole world
economy can be circumvented as long as at least one country provides a suf-
ficient liquidity for the rest of the world. This provides an optimal random
growth rate of inside money for national monetary policies.
Although we maintain market-clearing all the time, our conclusions are a
mix of Keynesian and monetarist wisdoms: The effect of national monetary
4See Sandas (2001).
5Becker (1962) is one of the pioneering approaches of non-rational individual behavior;
see Gode & Sunder (1993), Bouchaud et al. (2002), Mike & Farmer (2008), for further
developments on “zero intelligence” or “low intelligence” models.
6See also Champsaur & Cornet (1990), as well as Geanakoplos and Gray (1991) for a
justification of why seeing further is not seeing better.
7Cf. Geanaloplos & Sebenius (1983).
8Cf. Shiller (1981, 1987) and Odean (1999).
9Calculated in the same way as in Geanakoplos & Tsomocos (2002).
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policy depends upon whether the threshold just alluded to (which depends
on the heterogeneity of households of the whole world economy) is surpassed
or not. If a benchmark rate of growth leads, at some time T , to a liquidity
hole, then an expansionary monetary policy enables to escape from the hole.
However, if the instantaneous amount of inside money was already larger than
the threshold mentioned above, then an expansionary open market operation
will only induce domestic inflation, a fall in nominal interest rates, a currency
depreciation, and no change in the real terms of trade.
Due to the myopia of traders, familiar properties such as uncovered in-
terest parity or Fisher’s effect need not be valid along the transition to equi-
librium. This is roughly due to the possibility of intertemporal arbitrages
that can be observed ex post and are not forecast by myopic households. As
for the famous purchasing power parity, it may also fail in our setting due
to the fact that each agent faces two (infinitesimal) budget constraints, one
for each currency. Notice, nevertheless, that all these properties, despite be-
ing standard in static equilibrium theory, are hardly confirmed by empirical
tests.
There is a number of papers to which this one is closely related. Geanako-
plos & Tsomocos (2002) deal with international trades within a static general
equilibrium set-up with complete markets. Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003)
treat the case of incomplete markets but within a single country and still
in static framework. Giraud & Tsomocos (2009), as already alluded to, in-
troduce the monetary transition process to equilibrium but with complete
markets in a single country. Champsaur & Cornet (1990), Bonnisseau &
Ngue´namadji (2009) consider a transitional process equivalent to the present
one (in continuous and discrete time respectively) but in barter trades. Ap-
part from Giraud & Tsomocos (2006), none of the already mentioned papers
take advantage from the detailed micro-structure of Mertens (2003) double
auction.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section details the dynam-
ics of trades on incomplete markets. We prove that trajectories solving our
dynamics converge in probability to some allocation of assets which is ap-
proximately interim second-best efficient (to be defined there). Section 3
provides a discussion on arbitrage and the consequences of the main result
in terms of progression towards market efficiency. Section 4 extends the pre-
vious analysis to an economy with multiple currencies, exchange rates and
international trades. An optimal random growth of national inside money
is provided in section 5, together with a discussion of the classical theory of
comparative advantages. Technical proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
4
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2 The model
In this section, we lay out the assumptions that will be maintained through-
out the paper and then construct the dynamics.10
2.1 The fundamentals
We are working in a stylized long-run international economy E , with two
countries, A and B, and a finite time horizon T > 0.11
Risk is captured through a metric dynamical system
(
Ω,F ,P, (φt)t
)
where
(Ω,F ,P) is a probability space of uncertain states of nature ω, and (t, ω) 7→
φtω is a measurable flow which leaves P invariant, i.e., φtP = P for all
t ∈ [0, T ]. Information is revealed over time according to φtω. Indeed, given
(φt)t, one can construct a filtration over the completion of F which can be
interpreted as capturing the onfolding of information in the way it is usually
done in economics (see Arnold (1998, p. 72). All uncertainty is resolved at
time T > 0. (See Remark 1 below for examples of such dynamical systems.)
There are L non-perishable commodities ` = 1, ..., L in each country.
We denote by `k the `th commodity produced in country k. (Nigeria and
Venezuela may both sell crude oil, but it is Nigerian oil and Venezuelian oil.)
There are also two real long-lived securities in each country, denoted X and
Y , with the same maturity T .12 The amount of security X held by agent
1 in country A is XA1 and similarly for the other securities. Security X in
country k is a European contingent claim to some nonnegative quantity of
spot k-commodities, RkX ∈ L∞(Ω,F ,P,RL+) \ {0}, to be delivered at time
T . Let R := (RAX , R
A
Y , R
B
X , R
B
Y ) represent the global return. As soon as
SpanR(Ω) 6= L∞(Ω,F ,P,RL), markets are incomplete. For each agent i in
country k = A,B, a portfolio θi = (X
A
i , Y
A
i , X
B
i , Y
B
i ) ∈ R4 is a holding of
each asset, and may include short sales. We will often denote by θi,j ∈ R
(resp. Rj) the element of the portfolio θi (resp. of the return vector R) that
corresponds to security j.
Remark 1. Since myopic traders do not perfectly forecast future (random)
prices, the space of uncertain states Ω can be understood, if one wishes
so, as being the space of continuous asset price functions q : R → R4+2L+
which satisfy some initial condition. F can then be taken as the Borel σ-
field induced by the compact-open topology on Ω and P, e.g., the Wiener
measure on (Ω,F), i.e., the distribution on F of a standard Wiener process,
as is traditional in finance. One would then have: Wt(ω) = ω(t) and φsω(t) =
ω(s+ t).13 It should be clear in the sequel, however, that the randomness of
10By contrast with Giraud & Tsomocos (2009), in this section, markets are incomplete
but there is no money.
11Our whole analysis goes through with an arbitrary, finite number of countries.
12This is for convenience only: We could work with an arbitrary finite number of secu-
rities.
13See, e.g., Arnold (1998, p. 535 sq) for details.
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the stochastic process q(·) arising from the local interactions of boundedly
rational investors can be much wilder and more chaotic than a standard white
noise — which is consistent with empirical observation.
2.1.1 Households
Each country is populated by two types of agents i = 1, 2. Each (type
of) agent belongs to a single country. In order to wipe out any phenomenon
of imperfect competition, we assume that each type i is represented by a
continuum of identical clones [0, 1], equipped with the restriction, λ, of the
Lebesgue measure. (The space of individuals is therefore
(
[0, 1]4, λ⊗4
)
.)
To each agent i in country k is associated:
(i) a measurable initial portfolio ω 7→ θi(0, ω) ∈ R4+ of real securities at
time zero (no agent starts with short positions14 ); a measurable initial en-
dowment ω 7→ xi(0, ω) ∈
(
RL+
)2
of commodities arising from both countries.
(Citizens from the US may drive with Japanese cars and vice-versa.)
(ii) a random endowment ei(·) ∈ L∞+ := L∞
(
Ω,F ,P,R2L+
)
of spot con-
sumption commodities at time T ;
(iii) von Neumann preferences over time T -consumption bundles. These
preferences are assumed to be represented by a (Bernoulli) utility function
ui : L
∞
+ → R.
A pair of financial allocation of portfolios, θ = (θi)i ∈
(
R4
)4
and com-
modity allocations, x = (xi) ∈
(
R2L+
)4
is feasible if:1516
∑
i
θi = θ(0) and
∑
i
xi = x(0) and for every i, ei + θiR ≥ 0 P− a.s.
(1)
The last inequality requires that no investor goes bankrupt at time T .17
Feasibility therefore imposes that all promises be honored at T : Agents are
allowed to go arbitrarily short θi,j < 0 in any asset j provided they ultimately
keep their promises by reducing their initial holding at time T by θi,jRj. Let
τ(ω) ⊂ R12+6L denote the subset of feasible allocations in state ω.
For all i, Vi : R4+2L+ ×Ω× [0, T ]→ R denotes the expected indirect utility
derived by agent i at time T from a bundle zi(t) = (xi(t), θi(t)) ∈ R4+2L
conditional on the information available at time t ∈ [0, T ]:
Vi
(
zi(t), ω, t
)
:= EP
[
ui[ei + xi(t) + θi(t)R] | Ft
]
(ω). (2)
14Securities are to be thought of as real contracts, not as potential ones as it is often
the case in static GEI.
15Throughout this paper, z stands for the sum
∑
i zi for every variable z.
16For all θi = (X
A
i , Y
A
i , X
B
i , Y
B
i ) ∈ R4, θiR := (XAi ·RAX+Y Ai ·RAY , XBi ·RBX+Y Bi ·RBY ) ∈
R2L, a country-by-country scalar product.
17For a static general equilibrium analysis of international trades with default, see Peiris
& Tsomocos (2009).
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The following assumption will hold throughout the paper.
Assumption (C).
(i) ∀i, ui is C1, ∇ui(·) >> 0, ui is strictly quasi-concave and verifies the
boundary condition: u−1i (λ) is closed in R2L++.
(ii) (Ω,F) ⊂ (R,B(R)) and P is Borel.
(iii) For every z = (zi)i ∈ τ and every i, the mapping ω 7→ ui
[
ei(ω)+xi+
θiR(ω)
]
belongs to L1(Ω).
(iv) ∀K ⊂ R2L+ compact (nonvoid), ∃g ∈ L1(Ω,F ,P,R+) s.t.∣∣∣ ∂
∂z
ui(z, ω, t)
∣∣∣ ≤ g(ω), ∀z ∈ τ(ω) ∩K, P− a.e. ω ∈ Ω.
Assumptions (ii-iv) are technical, and are fulfilled, e.g., as soon as |Ω| <
+∞.18
2.2 The barter dynamics
In this section, only barter trades take place. Our exposition follows Giraud
& Tsomocos (2009), and we sometimes refer to this paper for supplementary
information.
Suppose that, along a path of trades, investors have no expectation about
the future, hence are entirely myopic. (Expectations will be introduced in the
next subsection.) When restricted to this class of economies, and under the
myopia assumption, our dynamics becomes similar to the ones first analyzed
by Champsaur & Cornet (1990), Bottazzi (1994) and Giraud (2004)19. Actu-
ally, it can be viewed as an extension to incomplete markets of Giraud (2004).
That is, the configuration set of the continuous-time dynamics is given by the
feasible set τ ; at each instant t, when the asset allocation is z(t), agents ex-
change infinitesimal trades in a tangent market Tz(t)E : 〈−zi(t),∇Vi(zi(t))〉i.
The latter is defined as a linear auxiliary economy with the same set of in-
dividuals, the same set of commodities and securities except that, now, each
individual’s set of trades is the shifted cone: −zi(t)+R4+2L++ , her initial endow-
ment is 0 (both in commodities and securities), and i values the infinitesimal
trade z˙i(t) according to:
20
∇Vi(zi(t)) · z˙i(t). (3)
In other words, in the tangent market Tz(t)E , trades are net, and i’s
short-sale upper-bound is given by her current stock zi(t).
21 Traders meet
every time on the tangent market, myopically trading in the direction of
18One could presumably weaken some of these assumptions. For the sake of not over-
burdening the presentation, we shall not strive for the utmost generality.
19See also Smale (1976b) for a seminal contribution along the same line.
20Assumptions (C)(iii) and (iv) guarantee that one can differentiate with respect to zi
under the integral of (2), so that the gradient, ∇Vi(zi(T ), ω, t), is well-defined.
21One can think of zi(t) as implicitly playing the role of i’s collateral.
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the steepest increase in their own, current expected utility. The budget
constraint of individual i is:
q(t) · z˙i(t) ≤ 0, and z˙i(t) ≥ −zi(t), (4)
where q(t) ∈ R4+2L+ is a vector of prices. The set of infinitesimal moves, z˙i(t),
that will actually take place is then given by the Walrasian allocations of the
linear economy Tz(t)E , taking place at the corresponding competitive price
q(t). The dynamics is therefore given by the following random differential
inclusion:
(z˙(t), q(t)) ∈WE[Tz(t)E](φtω), (z(0), q(0)) = (z0, q0)(ω), (5)
where (z0, q0) is some (measurable) random variable, and WE
[
Tz(t)E
]
is the
subset of Walras equilibria in net trades of Tz(t)E . That is, for each i,
z˙i(t) solves the linear optimization programme of (3) subject to (4) while∑
i z˙i(t) = 0. A random trade path can also be viewed as a measurable map
ϕ : [0, T ] × Ω × R16+8L+ with (t, z) 7→ ϕ(t, ω, z) continuous for every ω,22 for
which there exists a measurable price curve q : [0, T ] × Ω → R4+2L+ , also
continuous in t, and such that:
(ϕ˙(t, ω, z0), q(t, φtω)) ∈WE
[
Tϕ(t,ω,z0)E
]
(φtω), (ϕ(0, ω, z0), q(0)) = (z0, q0)(ω).
When uncertainty is absent, a random trade path reduces to the usual flow
of a (deterministic) differential inclusion.23
Proposition 1. Under assumptions (C), every world economy E
admits a random trade path and price curve, i.e., for every starting
random variable (z(0, ·), q(0, ·)), (5) admits a solution.
Proof. (1) According to Lemma 3.3 (vii) in Arnold & Schmalfuss (2001),
the sup over an uncountable set can be replaced by the one over an ex-
haustible countable set. Hence, vi(zi, ω, t) := max{∇Vi(zi, ω, t) · z˙i(t) | q(t) ·
z˙i(t) ≤ 0 and z˙i(t) ≥ −zi} is a measurable function of (zi, ω, t). It folllows
that (z, ω, t) 7→WE[TzE ] is measurable.
(2) For all (ω, t) ∈ Ω × [0, T ], z 7→ WE[TzE ] is u.s.c. with nonempty,
compact, convex values.
(3) Since, for all ω and a.e. t, z˙(t) verifies
∑
i z˙i(t) = 0, then, z(t) ∈ τ
a.e. Hence, for all ω, the short-sale constraint z˙i(t) ≥ zi(t) implies that ∀ω
||z˙(t)|| ≤ ∑i ||zi(t)||(ω) = ∑i ||zi(0)||(ω) a.e. in t. As for prices, they can be
normalized into, say, the unit sphere, so that ||WE[Tz(t)E ]||(ω) ≤ a(ω, t) with
a(ω, ·) ∈ L1+([0, T ]).
22ϕ need not be continuous with respect to ω.
23See Giraud & Tsomocos (2009), subsection 2.1, in order to grasp intuition on this
dynamics in the complete markets case.
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The conclusion then follows, e.g., from Theorem 4.1. in Papageorgiou
(1988).

Remark 2. This existence result should be contrasted with Hart’s (1975)
example of non-existence of static GEI equilibria, and compared with the
(generic both in endowments and asset structure) existence result of static
equilibria for GEI economies with real assets (Duffie & Shafer (1986)). Clearly,
this is due to the (random) constraint z˙i(t) ≥ −zi(t) which provides a (ran-
dom) upper-bound on short sales, unlike in standard GEI where no such
upper-bound is available (at least when there are several spot commodities).
2.3 Convergence toward Interim constrained optimal-
ity
The next issue is whether solution trajectories of our stochastic dynami-
cal process will converge towards anything akin to the Pareto set. First, we
need to define efficiency in a way well-suited to our environment. The follow-
ing definition is inspired from the literature devoted to efficiency in game-
theoretic environments with incomplete information24 as well, of course, as
from the notion of constrained optimality in static general equilibrium theory
with incomplete markets.25
Definition. (i) An admissible curve at z ∈ τ , is a continuous
random path ϕ : [0, η) × Ω → τ such that ϕ(0, ω) = z, ϕ is
differentiable at 0 and d
dt
Vi(ϕ(t, ω)) ≥ 0 for all i with one strict
inequality.
(ii) An allocation of assets z is constrained locally optimal interim at
time t ∈ [0, T ) and in state ω if there does not exist any admissible
curve at z.
Such allocations are called “locally” optimal because welfare improve-
ments are tested only for infinitesimal reallocations. “Interim” stresses that
such allocations are optimal at some intermediary time where all the infor-
mation is not yet known by the households. “Constrained” underlines the
fact that optimality is tested only with respect to the available (possibly
incomplete) asset structure. Let Θ denote the random subset of interim
constrained locally optimal allocations.
Remark 3. This definition of optimality departs from the one used, say, in
Geanakoplos & Polemarchakis (1986, and in most of the literature devoted to
GEI) in as much it does not rely upon some second-period equilibrium (which
requires rational expectations in some way or another). As a consequence,
even if an interim constrained optimal allocation in assets is reached in finite
time, there may still be a need for reopening spot markets after time T .
24Cf., e.g, Myerson (1991, p. 487 sq.).
25See Geanakoplos (1990) for an introduction.
9
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Since Θ is evaluated with the help of conditional expected utilities, the
set of allocations and portfolios that are constrained interim optimal at time
t depend upon t; This dependence is captured through the randomness of
ω 7→ Θ(ω): As time evolves, so does ω via φsωt, hence also Θ. Intuition
borrowed from Bayesian decision theory suggests, however, that interim con-
strained efficiency at time t < T should imply interim constrained efficiency
at any posterior time t′ ∈ [t, T ). Intuitively, Pareto efficiency with respect
to the information known at time t does not only require that the allocation
be Pareto efficient for each state ω (ex post optimality) but also that the
allocation “optimally” insures all risk-averse agents over the different states
of the world — at least, given φtω. The finer the information, the easier it
should be to insure oneself optimally, so that sub-optimality at time t′ should
imply sub-optimality at time t < t′. A simple explanation is that agents in
the standard Bayesian model are dynamically consistent. For instance, the
well-known no-trade theorem rests on the statement that any ex ante efficient
allocation is interim efficient26 so that purely speculative trade is impossi-
ble. This property, however, need not hold in our set-up for a general metric
dynamical system (Ω,F ,P, (φt)t). This calls for the following restriction on
the onfolding of information: Θ(ω) ⊂ Θ(φtω) for any ω and t ∈ [0, T ]. We
shall impose a slightly stronger restriction:
Assumption (B).
The random set Θ verifies: Θ(ω) = Θ(φtω) ∀ω,∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Assumption (B) says that, for every state ω, if at some time t, an alloca-
tion is optimal, then it was already so earlier, and it will remain so later on,
whatever being the revealed information. In other words, if no-trade occurs
at some stage t because, at the given allocation of assets, all gains to trade
seem to have been exhausted, no-trade will still prevail in the future, and
the same allocation would also have induced no-trade in the past. Notice
that this assumption does not imply that the onfolding of information has
no influence on the current gains to trade: They may well vary across time,
depending upon the information shared by the investors. Therefore, (B) is
a limit condition on the dynamic consistency of Bayesian agents: Whether
gains to trade are exactly zero or not does not depend upon information.
Several concepts of convergence are available in our stochastic setting.
Here, we use one of the weakest possible criteria. A sequence (Xn)n of random
variables converges to a random variable X in probability if:
lim
n
P
[
ω : |Xn(ω)−X(ω)| > ε
]
= 0 ∀ε > 0.
Given some random trade path ϕ(·), a compact random set A27 is stable
under ϕ if
26see Milgrom & stokey (1982), Holmstro¨m & Myerson (1983).
27Since F is complete, A is a compact random set if it takes closed/compact values and
its graph is measurable.
10
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(i) it is invariant under ϕ, i.e., ϕ(t, ω)Θ(ω) = Θ(φtω)∀t ∈ [0, T ].
(ii) ∀ε > 0, there exists a random neighborhood, C, of A, such that:28
B P
[
d(C|A) ≥ ε] < ε,
B ϕ(t, ω, C(ω)) ⊂ C(φtω) ∀t ∈ [0, T ], i.e., C is forward invariant
under ϕ.
A is a global attractor of ϕ if, for any random variable z0,
P lim
t→∞
d
(
ϕ(t, ·, z0(·)), A(φt·)) = 0.
Finally, A is globally asymptotically stable if it is stable and a global at-
tractor. The following result states that, if we wait long enough, continuous
trades will utlimately enable households to converge (in probability) toward
an interim constrained efficient allocation of assets. It can be interpreted as
a version of “Coase theorem” within our specific set-up. The proof is given
in the Appendix.
Theorem 1.— Under (C) and (B), and for T =∞, Θ(t) is globally
asymptotically stable for any trade path, ϕ(·), solving (5).
The next Corollary provides a uniform attraction property easier to in-
terpret economically.
Corollary.— Under (C) and (B), for any random compact neigh-
borhood C of Θ, then there exists a φ-invariant set Ω ⊂ Ω of full
measure such that for every ω ∈ Ω and any random compact set D
of R4L+16, if z(0, ω) ∈ D(ω), there exists a τ(ω) > 0 with
ϕ(t, ω) ∈ intC(ω) ∀t ≥ τ(ω).
In words: If households trade sufficiently enough, the economy will be
ε-close to the set of interim constrained efficient allocations in the metric
of convergence in probability. Another interpretation is in terms of speed
of trades. Notice, indeed, that there is no absolute speed in this barter
dynamics. That is, the units in which infinitesimal trades are computed
is partially arbitrary: So far, in our theory, nothing prevents trades from
occuring at, say, the celerity of light.29 Therefore, for a fixed T , if the speed
of trades is sufficiently high, the same convergence result holds.
Remark 4. The stability definition actually allows the random neighbor-
hood C(ω) to lie possibly far away from Θ(ω) on a ω-set of small probability.
Therefore, the notion of probabilistic convergence used here is very weak.
28As usual, the distance between a point x and a set A is defined as d(x,A) =
infy∈A d(x, y), while d(C|A) := supx∈C d(x,A).
29Provided it is compatible with the short-sale constraint which nevertheless provides
an upper-bound on the scale (hence, the speed) of infinitesimal trades.
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The possible convergence ω-almost surely (or in Lp) is left for further re-
search, and is likely to fail in general.
Remark 5. Duffie & Huang (1985, following many others) consider a prob-
lem that is close, but not identical to, the one studied here. They prove that
continuous-time retrading enables to mimic every (complete markets) Arrow-
Debreu equilibrium by means of an (incomplete markets) Radner equilibrium.
The main difference with our approach is that, here, agents are myopic, and
we get (only) a probabilistic convergence towards approximate second-best
efficiency. There, agents are far-sighted in the sense that they perfectly fore-
cast the law of the whole stream of future random prices and are able to
solve the corresponding intertemporal optimization programme. As a con-
sequence, Duffie & Huang (1985) get exact first-best efficiency. Otherwise
stated, the whole literature devoted to spanning properties of retrading in
incomplete markets still consider equilibrium properties (comparing various
competing notions of equilibria), while we are dealng with a transitional
process to equilibrium.
2.4 Locally rational expectations
Let us now introduce agents’ expectations. Agent i’s expectations are
captured through a saving function, si : R4+2L++ → R4+2L+ which associates to
current asset allocation, zi(t), a bundle of saved commodities and securities:
0 ≤ si[zi(t)] ≤ zi(t). Let us denote by δi(t) := zi(t) − si[zi(t)] the bundle
of objects of exchange that, given his expectations, agent i is ready to put
on the market at time t. Of course, 0 ≤ δi(t) ≤ zi(t). A tangent market
Tz(t),δ(t)E is defined in the same way as in the barter case, except that the
budget constraint (4) is replaced by:
q(t) · z˙i(t) ≤ 0, and z˙i(t) ≥ −δi(t). (6)
When agents’ expectations become so pessimistic that δi(t) = 0, for every
i, then no-trade will occur in the tangent market (even though different
expectations might reveal beneficial gains-to-trade). The myopic economy of
the previous subsection corresponds to the particular no-saving case: δi(t) =
zi(t), every t and i.
30The dynamics with expectations is now given by:
(z˙(t), q(t)) ∈WE[Tz(t),δ(t)E], (z(0), q(0), δ(0)) = (z0, q0, δ0). (7)
The next Proposition is a straightforward corollary of Theorem
1:
Proposition 2.— Provided that, for every household i, expecta-
tions verify: δi(t) > 0 a.e. t, the conclusions of Proposition 1 and
Theorem 1 hold after having replaced (5) with (7).
30This case —where everybody is forced to put for sale all of her current endowments—
corresponds to Lucas’ initial approach.
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3 On market efficiency once again
The theory of market arbitrage efficiency is usually justified by the asser-
tion that if there were profit-making opportunities in flexible markets, they
would be quickly found and exploited, and the resulting trading activity
would change prices in ways that would remove them. This informational
efficiency of prices translates into the non-arbitrage hypothesis common to
financial pricing and static general equilibrium (with incomplete markets) or,
equivalently, into the martingale property of discounted (fair or equilibrium)
prices. It should not be confused, in general, with Pareto-optimality. The
absence of arbitrage attributed to informationally efficient markets, however,
raises an embarrassing puzzle: To remove market inefficiencies we must have
traders who are motivated to exploit them. But if the market is already per-
fectly efficient, there is no possibility to make excess profits, so that the very
notion of a fully efficient market is inherently contradictory. As convincingly
argued by Geanakoplos & Farmer (2009), “the need for a nonequilibrium
theory is apparent. Equilibrium theory predicts that markets are perfectly
efficient, and thus violations of efficiency cannot be addressed without go-
ing outside it. The time scale for the degradation of a profitable strategy is
inherently a disequilibrium phenomenon”.
In our set-up, a trivial answer goes as follows, at least when |Ω| <∞. As
long as t < T , it may well be the case that the asset price system q(t) ∈ R4+2L+
turns out, ex post, to exhibit some arbitrage opportunity in the sense of static
GEI theory, i.e., is such that there exists some portfolio θ(t) ∈ R4 with( −q(t)
P (T ) ◦R
)
θ(t) > 0,
where, here, ◦ is the usual state-by-state product of GEI, and P (T ) is the,
say square-integrable, state-dependent spot price of commodities at matu-
rity.31 Because of the myopia of households, nothing prevents the price sys-
tem (q(t), P (T )) from exhibiting ex-post arbitrage — and, in fact, nothing
proves that P (T ), as defined here, will have a finite variance... This stands in
sharp contrast with the static GEI approach where equilibrium prices with
perfect forecast preclude arbitrage. As is well-know, however, absence of
arbitrage is probably one of the most popular properties of economic and
financial models which fares most badly with empirical tests (more on this
in the next subsection).
In this section, we explore an alternate interpretation of arbitrage in order
to examine whether our transition to equilibrium narrative permits to give
some sense to the highly disputed no-arbitrage property. For this purpose,
let us recall the microstructure underlying infinitesimal trades in the tangent
market, Tz,δE .
31The integrability or regularity of P (T ) is immaterial for our discussion.
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3.1 Limit-orders as fictitious agents
As we have just seen, our dynamics results in a set of curves z(·) (possibly
degenerate at some point whenever the economy reaches some interim second-
best efficient point).32 Imagine, now, an electron microscope aimed at a
point z ∈ τ . Under enlargement, the neighborhood of z and the environment
above it become linear: We get the tangent market TzE . So far, we simply
postulated that infinitesimal flows are induced by the Walrasian equilibria
of TzE . For reasons already spelt out in Giraud & Tsomocos (2009), this
is just a proxy of the actual mechanism at work in our continuous double
auction. With even greater magnification, we see, instead of the reduced-
form concept of Walras equilibrium, a strategic market-game G[TzE ], where
investors send limit-price orders in continuous time to a central clearing house
which instantaneously execute some of them according to the rules of Mertens
(2003) limit-price mechanism. From the standpoint of the central clearing
house, investors are “invisible”: all they can see is the order book populated
by a myriad of anonymous orders.
For simplicity, let’s begin with a two-good barter economy. A strategy
of player i in the local game G[TzE ] associated to the tangent market TzE is
to send a limit-price order to the market. Only selling orders are allowed —
but this implies no loss of generality: if a player wants to buy a commodity
or a security, he just has to sell another item in exchange. A limit-order to
sell item commodity ` in exchange for item c gives a quantity Q` to be sold,
and a relative price q+` /q
+
c . The order is to sell up to Q`c units of item ` in
exchange for item c if the actual relative price verifies q`/qc ≥ q+` /q+c . The
amount Q` put up for sale will stay untouched at any price q` < qcq
+
` /q
+
c ,
and is intended to be fully sold at any price q` ≥ qcq+` /q+c . When q
+
`
q+c
= 0,
one gets a familiar market order. A limit-order to “sell” commodity ` against
c, at relative prices q+c = 0, q
+
` > 0 is, in fact, an order not to buy c, and
to sell as much of ` as possible. The key in understanding the relationship
between the reduced-form model and G[TzE ] lies in Mertens’ trick, which we
now recall.
Mertens’ trick. Suppose that the central clearing house fixes q as a current
price vector. Checking whether a sell-order (Q`, q
+
` /q
+
c ) must be (totally
or, at least, partially) executed at q, is equivalent to solving the following
programme (see Fig. 1):
max
{q+`
q+c
z˙ | q · z˙ ≤ 0 and z˙ ≥ (0, ...,−Q`, ...0)
}
. (8)
32Actually, Giraud & Tsomocos (2009) provide sufficient conditions for the (generic)
uniqueness of the solution curve z(·) (locally in time). One could provide an analogous
analysis here, provided |Ω| <∞.
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Fig. 1. Limit-price orders are fictitious linear agents.
−Qi
→--
(q+` , q
+
c )
`
c
qz˙∗i →-- q
Here, indeed, the relative price qc/q` (set by the market) is lower than the
limit-price q+c /q
+
` , so that the order to sell ` against c is entirely executed: The
agent i who sent this order will sell the quantity Q`i of good ` against (q`/qc)Q
`
i
units of commodity c, and will end up at z˙∗i . But z˙
∗
i coincides with the
Walrasian demand of the fictitious agent with linear utility vi(z˙) := (q
+
c /q
+
` )z˙
and short-sale bound δi := Qi. In other words, a limit-price order can be
viewed as a fictitious linear “agent”, whose (non-normalized) “utility” is
given by the relative price (or “exchange rate”, or “personal price” at which
the sender of the order agrees to exchange one good for another) q+` /q
+
c , and
whose “short-sale bound” is the offer (0, ..., Q`, ..., 0).
More generally, in a L-commodity barter tangent market, an order is
a vector of relative prices bi := (q+1 , ..., q
+
L ) and a vector of offers e
i :=
(Q1, ..., QL), to be understood as follows: If the actual relative price of good
c against good ` verifies:
qc
q`
≥ q
+
c
q+`
,
then player i is ready to sell up to quantity Q` of commodity ` against c.
There is no loss of generality in restricting ourselves to sell-orders since a
buying order, say of commodity `, can be replicated as an order to sell any
other commodity against `. For simplicity, we assume that, within a single
period t, a player i can send a single order (bi, ei) to the market. This also
involves no loss, since this player’s short-run utility is linear in TzE , so that
his demand and supply correspondence can be mimicked by means of a single
limit-order.33
33By contrast, in a non-linear economy, to mimick the demand and supply correspon-
dences of a player would require a continuum of limit-orders.
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Next, the order book obtained by pooling together the whole set of limit-
orders sent by “true” agents to the clearing house at time t can be viewed
as a fictitious linear (possibly nonatomic) economy Lt. In the economy Lt,
the clearing house selects a trade price and executes orders accordingly. Re-
call, however, that each agent i in E actually stands for a continuum, [0, 1],
of identical clones, having the same characteristics. As a consequence, the
unique strategy-proof strategy-profile of the game G[TzE ] consists, for a.e.
clone h ∈ ⊗4i=1[0, 1] in reporting truthfully his current characteristics at time
t, i.e., in quoting ∇Vh(z(t), ω, t) as limit-price, and sending δh(t) as supply.
3.2 Progression toward market efficiency ?
In this perspective, Theorem 1 provides a first step toward a out-of-equilibrium
narrative of how arbitrage opportunities disappear in a perfectly flexible
market. Indeed, a standard characterization of Pareto-optimality is that
in Θ0(t) ∩ int(τ), all the traders should have collinear gradients.34 Thus,
what Theorem 1 says is that, up to a normalization, agents’ gradients,
∇Vi(zi(t), ω, t) will converge (in probability) towards approximately the same
vector, say ∇∗. But the micro-structure of trades given by our continuous
double auction is such that, at every time t, trader’s i current gradient,
∇Vi(zi(t), ω, t) will exactly coincide with his quoted limit-price. That is, at
time t, i will send a signal to the clearing house saying that, if, say,
qj(t) ≥ ∂Vi(zi(t), ω, t)
∂θi,j(t)
,
then, i is willing to sell a certain amount of security j. If, the last inequality
is reversed, then i wishes to buy a certain amount of j. Suppose that two
traders, i and h, have different normalized gradients at time t, so that
∂Vi(zi(t), ω, t)
∂θi,j(t)
>
∂Vh(zh(t), ω, t)
∂θh,j(t)
.
This means that there is an arbitrage opportunity: An arbitrageur (whose
own marginal utility for j lies somewhere in between those of i and h) will
buy the asset j cheap from h and sell it dear to i. This arbitrage opportunity
is not infinite, because of the constraint θ˙j(t) > −θj(t), so that no trader can
go arbitrarily short. However, the arbitrageur will obviously try to benefit
as much as possible from the situation given his own current constraint. Of
course, prices at time t will change as the arbitrageur carries out her trade:
The double auction will determine the amount of the surpluses that can be
realized, as well as the fraction of this total surplus captured by the arbi-
trageur. To put it differently, positive local gains-to-trade (as defined in this
paper) can be readily interpreted as a measure of the arbitrage opportunities
surviving on the market.
34int(X) denotes the interior of the set X.
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More precisely, let us formally define the measure χ(z) of local gains-
to-trade, following Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003). Let z˙i ∈ R4+2L be an
infinitesimal trade vector of i in some tangent market, with positive compo-
nent representing purchases and negative ones representing sales. For any
scalar χ ≥ 0, define:
z˙i,j(χ) := min
{
z˙i,j,
z˙i,j
1 + χ
}
. (9)
There are local gains to χ-diminished trades in the barter tangent market Tγ(t)E
if there exist feasible infinitesimal trades (z˙i(t))i such that z˙i(t) ≥ −δi(t) for
all i, and Vi(z˙i(χ), ω, t) ≥ 0 for all i with at least one strict inequality. In
words, it should be possible for households to Pareto-improve on no-trade in
spite of the χ-handicap on infinitesimal trades. For every z ∈ τ, the mea-
sure χ(z) is the supremum of all handicaps that permit Pareto-improvement.
Clearly, z is Pareto-optimal if, and only if, χ(z) = 0. According to the previ-
ous discussion, χ(z) can be equivalently interpreted as a measure of the lack
of constrained Pareto-optimality (interim) of z or as a measure of arbitrage
opportunities.
Since traders are myopic and trades take time, they cannot exhaust in-
stantaneously χ(z) > 0. But Theorem 1 tells us that, if consumers can trade
during a sufficiently long time, then eventually, roughly all the arbitrage op-
portunities should disappear (at least in probability). An estimate of the time
scale for the progression toward market efficiency is suggested in Geanakoplos
& Farmer (2009) as being at least eight years. Of course, as investors start
to recognize the opportunity and exploit it, it will make it shrink (i.e., it will
reduce χ(z)) and thus make it harder for others to see it, extending the time
until its superior profitability is completely extinguished.35 In any case, we
should not be surprised that inefficiencies disappear slowly. The speed of con-
vergence in our model provides a first attempt, within a general-equilibrium
framework, for quantifying the time-scale for the progression toward market
efficiency.
3.3 Is elimination of arbitrage Pareto-improving ?
An important caveat must be added, however. Farmer & Geanakoplos
(2009) provide, indeed, anecdotal empirical evidence that not only financial
markets might not always remove every arbitrage opportunity (even slowly)
but, in certain circumstances, they may even amplify them. Can this be
reconciled with our theory ?
We answer to this question by means of the simplest possible example
of market-making “arbitrage”, which we henceforth refer to as arbitrage,
though it may also include financial innovation or other forms of market-
35see Farmer (2002).
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completion.36 Two markets for assets are segmented (physically or insti-
tutionally) and unable to trade with one another without the help of an
arbitrageur. In the classic case, when arbitrage is beneficial, the initial dis-
tribution of the assets between the two markets is Pareto-inefficient ; the
entrance of an arbitrageur helps smooth risk, making all parties better off.
This is classic gains from trade: it is the same as saying that the explorers
who traded British luxuries for Indian spices benefited to both countries.
This is essentially the content of Theorem 1 above. However, it holds under
the implicit assumption that all the traders are “rational” (albeit myopic) in
the sense that they correctly forecast the “true” probability measure P. The
following example shows that elimination of arbitrage may not be Pareto-
improving when traders do not perfectly forecast P.
Example. There are two traders, two spot commodities, (x, y), one
riskless asset promising one unit of commodity x for sure, and a risky asset
which yields as real dividend at time T , the random variable Y of commodity
y, whose objective law is N(µ, 1), with µ > 0. Consumer 1 has utility
u1(x1, y1) := x1 − e−cy1 , where (x1, y1) ∈ R2+ is 1’s time T -consumption of
spot commodities (with c > 0 the absolute risk aversion). Consumer 2 has
utility: u2(x2, y2) = x2 + by2. At time 0, initial endowments in commodities
are zero, and in securities: θ1(0) = (1, 2), θ2(0) = (2, 1). To begin with,
suppose that both individuals correctly forecast Y ’s Gaussian distribution.
No additional news are delivered between time 0 and T . The exogenous
parameters, c, µ and b are chosen so that:
ce−2µc+2c
2
< 1 < b and bµ > 1. (10)
At each time t ≥ 0, given her current portfolio θ1(t) = (θ1,x(t), θ1,y(t)), the
marginal utility of trader 1 (which is also the limit-price he sends to the
clearing house at t) for securities is
(
1, EP
[
ce−cθi,y(t)Y
])
with:
EP
[
ce−cθi,y(t)Y
]
=
c√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
e−cθi,y(t)y−
(y−µ)2
2 dy = e−θi,y(t)cµ+
1
2
(cθi,y(t))
2
.
The gradient of trader 2, at the same time t, is: (1, b). Suppose that the
markets of both consumers are segmented (physically, or institutionally) and
unable to trade with one another without the help of an arbitrageur. In
particular, at time 0, their quoted limit-prices, q1(0) =
(
1, ce−2µc+2c
2
)
and
q2(0) =
(
1, b
)
, will stand as prices prevailing on each individual’s own mar-
ket. Condition (10) then implies that an arbitrageur who could buy or sell
the risky asset at (internal, normalized) market prices in both consumers’
markets, would observe an arbitrage opportunity by buying cheap 1’s risky
asset and selling it dear to trader 2 while doing the opposite transaction
36Glen Weyl (2007) proposes an analogous example but without making explicit the
underlying microstructure of trades.
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for the riskless asset. According to Theorem 1, actually, connecting both
markets suffices to partially eliminate the arbitrage opportunity: if T is suf-
ficiently large and agents trade according to our continuous double auction,
then, with probability 1, almost all social surplus available from trades will
be realized. Actually, trades conducted by the double auction will follow a
straight line toward the final allocation θ1(T ) = (3, 0), θ2(T ) = (0, 3). The
welfare of consumer 1 has increased from 1 − e−2µc+2c2 (at time 0) to 2 (at
time T−); that of consumer 2, from 2 + bµ to 3bµ. Along the trade path,
(normalized) prices resulting from trades will be constantly equal to (1, 1).
As t→ T−, the arbitrage induced by the disagreement of traders about the
value of their securities does not disappear because the traders’ gradient do
not coincide (even asymptotically) while the resulting allocation of portfolio
converges toward the boundary of the Edgeworth box. Nevertheless, in the
same way as local gains-to-trade decrease across time, trades diminish the
size of arbitrage so that the traditional wisdom is confirmed.37
What happens, now, if agents do not perfectly forecast P ? Suppose
that Y actually follows N(0, 1), while both consumers still believe that Y ∼
N(µ, 1), with µ > 0. Keep all the other characteristics of the previous
example unchanged, and suppose, in addition, that ce2c
2
= b. Then, the
initial situation at time 0 is (objectively) already Pareto-optimal since the
two consumers have collinear gradients. Subjectively, however, they both
believe, as in the previous example, that there are beneficial local gains to
trade. They will therefore trade in the same way as earlier, ending up with(
(3, 0), (0, 3)
)
as final allocation. The asymptotic social welfare will be 2,
whereas it initially was 3− ec2 inducing a global welfare loss of ec2 − 1 > 0.
Reducing arbitrage now causes a suboptimal allocation of risk, harming the
investors.
4 Money and Central Banks
So far, the issue of international trading and exchange rates could not
arise since all trades were barter. Let us now introduce fiat money. Any
purchase is subject to a cash-in-advance constraint. The money of country k
is called k-money. Money is present in the private endowments of households.
Following Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003), we call it “outside money”. At
time t, agent i has an endowment mki (t) of outside k-money, k = A,B. Also,
in each country k, a government acts on markets, through a Central Bank
by injecting k-money into the world economy, termed inside money. Outside
money is owned by the agents free and clear of debt; inside money is always
accompanied by debt when it comes into the hands of the households. The
quantities mk = (mki (0))i of outside money at time 0 are exogenously fixed,
and mk(0) =
∑
im
k
i (0) represents the aggregate stock of outside k-money
37Notice, however, that the reallocation of securities induced by trades does not increase
individual portfolio’s diversification, on the contrary.
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held by the agents throughout the world at the beginning of time.
There are two kinds of bonds. Short-term (intraperiod or overnight)
k-bonds at time t promise one unit of k-money at the “end” of period t.
Long-term (interperiod) k-bonds at time t promise one unit of k-money at
the “beginning” of period t+dt.38 By rolling over a long deposit by means of
interperiod loans, agents can save money against any future time period. Let
rk(t) (resp. rˆk(t)) be the interest rates on the short- (resp. long-) term loans
in country k. There is no need for considering interperiod loans of longer
duration since with rollover, any zero-coupon bond, Bk(t, T ) := e
∫ T
t rˆ
k(s)ds,
can be mimicked by means of instantaneous interperiod bonds. In order to
keep a clear distinction between the roles of the two types of interest rates,
households are allowed only to sell intraperiod bonds and to buy interperiod
bonds in all countries. Equivalently, they can borrow on the intraperiod loan
markets, while they can deposit money on interperiod markets.39 An agent
who borrows ε in the intraperiod (resp. deposits ε in the interperiod) loan
market at the beginning (resp. end) of period t will have a debt of er
k(t)dtε
(resp. will owe erˆ
k(t)dtε) at the end of period t (resp. beginning of period
t + dt). Short-term k-interest rates, rk(·), are exogenously fixed by the k-
Central Bank and publicly known in advance by every household of the world
economy. By contrast, long-term rates, rˆk(t), are endogenously determined
on the loan market.
4.1 Monetary policy
The Central Bank of country k has two monetary policy instruments: It
sets the short-term interest rates rk(t) and clears its budget at each period
t.40 For this purpose, it auctions off in continuous time the quantities of
k-inside money, Mk(t) and Mˆk(t).41 Borrowing and depositing occur in local
currencies. We assume that the amount of k-money inventoried by each
household at the end of period t is automatically deposited or, equivalently,
invested in the zero-coupon bond bearing the interperiod (long-run) interest
rate, rˆk(t). Hence, money can serve as a profitable store of value.
An asset issued in country k can be bought only with k-money. Hence,
the unique way for a household of country A to buy a security of country B
38Giraud and Tsomocos (2009) only dealt with intraperiod bonds.
39The difference, rk(t) − rˆk(t), can be interpreted either as a short-run bid-ask spread
or as the difference between short-term and long-term rates. In order to authorize long
term borrowing, one would need to introduce private banks. We here focus on the role of
the Central Bank which only lends over short periods. On the other hand, in this stylized
world with infinite horizon, permitting households to borrow money on the interperiod
market would open the door for Ponzi schemes (obtained by financing an intraperiod debt
by means of further interperiod borrowing.
40Permanent public deficit is not allowed in this paper. We leave this issue for further
research.
41For simplicity, the Bank of country k does not have currency reserves in k′-currency.
This could be added to our model without impairing the essence of our results.
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is to pay in B-money for this asset. But if this agent does not already hold
sufficiently outside B-money in her pocket, the unique way for her to get
B-money consists in selling A-money on the corresponding foreign exchange
(FX) market or else in borrowing B-money to the B-Central Bank. Even
in this second case, this agent will have to pay back er
k(t) times her loan in
B-money. Unless she transacted only B-assets, she may need to go through
the foreign exchange market in order to change part of her A-cash (obtained
from trading A-assets) into B-money. Thus, there is room for opening FX
markets.
Three types of demands for money therefore emerge in this setup. Money
serves as a store of value. In addition, since there is uncertainty (captured by
the filtration F), agents hold money for speculative and precautionary rea-
sons. When inside money is borrowed on the intra-day market at rate rk(t),
we speak of the transactions demand for money, as discussed in Giraud and
Tsomocos (2009): The higher the interest rate, the fewer infinitesimal trans-
actions in securities will be sought, and —ceteris paribus— the lower will
be the demand for inside money. The higher the nominal value of infinitesi-
mal purchases desired (and the higher the money value of sales desired), the
greater will be the demand for money, given the same intra-day rate. Finally,
since countries A and B may set different interest rates, rA(t) 6= rB(t), there
will be an arbitrage among traders between borrowing money from their own
domestic Central Bank or else from the foreign Central Bank. This arbitrage
will result in the exchange rate piAB(t) between A and B-money.
We denote by mki (t) the quantity of k-money owned by household i at
the beginning of time t. Depending upon its locally rational expectations, i
decides to spend the amount 0 ≤ µki (t) ≤ mki (t) on various markets at time
t, and to save mki (t)− µki (t).
4.2 The time structure of markets
In a way similar to Giraud & Tsomocos (2009) and Dubey and Geanakoplos
(2003)42, and for the sake of clarity, in each period t, six steps meet in the
following order:43
α) The cash gained from deposits comes due, i.e., i receives
erˆ
k(t−)dt(mki (t
−) − µki (t−)) ≥ 0, k = A,B (where rˆk(t−) is the
left-side limit limτ→t,τ<t rk(τ)).
β) the FX market where both currencies can be exchanged against
each other;
γ) the inside monetary market, where agents and the Central
Bank meet within each country k. There, agent i borrows the
quantity m˜ki (t) ≥ 0 to each k-Central Bank (k = A,B).
42See also Geanakoplos & Tsomocos (2002).
43This time structure is crucial for our results. In particular, a different analysis would
emerge if FX markets were to open after the inside money market.
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δ) Then, the domestic financial markets open, where securities
issued in country k can be traded in k-money. The flow, z˙i(t),
captures the impact of infinitesimal trades on i’s portfolio, zi(t).
ε) Intraperiod loans come due: Household i having borrowed
m˜ki (t) has to repay back e
rk(t)dtm˜ki (t) to the k-Central Bank, and
this for each country k.
η) Inventoried money, mki (t)−µki (t), is invested on the interperiod
loan market.
At time tδ, the profits of the k-Central Bank will be equal to r
k(t)Mk(t)dt.
They are distributed at time (t+ dt)α by each Central Bank as interperiod-
returns so as to balance its budget. Since the excess return of i’s deposit
(received at time (t+dt)α) in k-currency will be rˆ
k(t)(mki (t)−µki (t))dt, budget
balancedness of the k-Central Bank means that Mˆk(t) is chosen so that the
resulting interperiod interest rate, rˆk(t), solves the following equation:
rk(t)Mk(t) = rˆk(t)
(
mk(t)− µk(t)
)
, (11)
where the right-hand side is the total amount of interest earned by investors
on the k-interperiod time t-loan market.
4.3 The foreign exchange market
An endogenous exchange rate, piAB(t), is determined at each time tβ as a
foreign market clearing price between A and B currencies. The rate piAB(t)
is the amount of A-currency that one unit of B-currency will buy at time
t (of course, piBA(t) = 1/piAB(t)). Each household can participate in both
sides of the FX market with her domestic currency or the foreign currency
she has accumulated in previous periods. Let us denote by 0 ≤ κki (t) ≤ µki (t)
the part of µki (t) that household i is ready to change into k
′-currency at time
tβ. One more notation, ρ
k(t) := κki (t) − pikk′(t)κk′i (t), and we are able to
define the world quantity of outside k-money that will be available in order
to borrow inside k-money at time tβ as: µ
k(t) − ρk(t). The exchange rate,
piAB(t), is then defined as the clearing market price on the FX market:44
piAB(t) :=
κA(t)
κB(t)
. (12)
Now, the short-term intraperiod rate, rk(t), in country k is determined by
the ratio between outside and inside money:45
rk(t) =
µk(t)− ρk(t)
Mk(t)
≥ 0. (13)
44 x
0 := 0.
45We refer to Giraud & Tsomocos (2009) for the mechanics of interest rates behind (13)
(to be understood with the convention x/0 := 0).
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For simplicity, (13) assumes that no individual exchanges k-money for k′-
money at time t with no intention to spend it on commodity or security
k′-markets at the very time t. We shall drop this restriction in subsection
4.8 infra. Thanks to (12), (13) simplifies to:
rk(t) =
µk(t)
Mk(t)
. (14)
The interperiod rate, rˆk(t), is given by:
rˆk(t) =
Mˆk(t)
mk(t)− µk(t) ≥ 0. (15)
It follows from (11) and (15) that rk(t)Mk(t) = Mˆk(t). Therefore, the quan-
tity of k-currency, rk(t)Mk(t), that is taken away from the economy by the
k-Central Bank will return to citizens in the form of interperiod excess re-
turns. As a consequence, the global stock, mk(t), remains constant and vari-
ations in the world amount of outside k-money available for trades, µk(t),
are solely due to the investors’ expectations. An important point is that the
k-cash received from the k-Bank as interperiod return will be received by k-
citizens only at time (t+dt)α. Hence, although we do not explicitly impose a
budget constraint on each Central-Bank, each government budget is almost
always balanced. Indeed, at the end of period t, the k-Central Bank has a
non-negative profit rk(t)Mk(t). At the beginning of period t+ dt, this profit
is entirely redistributed to his shareholders, and the government budget is
balanced. “Between” tα and tδ, however, the government k “temporarily”
incurs a deficit of Mk(t) that will be immediately replenished once all the
agents repay their borrowed inside k-money at tδ.
4.4 Budget constraints
We denote by qk(t) ∈ R2+L+ the vector of prices at time t of assets issued
in k, expressed in k-currency. The stock of outside k-money hold by agent i
(belonging to k) must satisfy the following differential equation (where the
variation m˙ki (t) is computed at time (t+ dt)α:
m˙ki (t) = e
rˆk(t)
[
mki (t)− µki (t)
]
+ pikk
′
(t)κk
′
i (t)− µki (t)− qk(t) · z˙ki (t) (16)
Finally, let us denote by m˜ki (t) the amount of inside k-money borrowed by
household i to Central Bank k. One gets:46
m˜ki (t) :=
µki (t) + pi
kk′(t)κk
′
i (t)− κki (t)
µk(t)
Mk(t), (17)
46Notice that, for (17) to make sense, we need FX markets to open at tα “before”
households borrow inside money from Central Banks at tβ .
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Of course,
∑
i∈k,k′ m˜
k
i (t) = M
k(t). Now, the budget set of household i is
defined by:
(i) a short-sale constraint: z˙ki (t) ≥ −δki (t),
(ii) a cash-in-advance constraint in each currency:47
qk(t) · z˙k+i (t) ≤ µki (t) + pikk
′
(t)κk
′
i (t)− κki (t) + m˜ki (t), (18)
(iii) a budget constraint given by the duty of fully delivering on
one’s loan in each currency k:48
(1 + rk(t))m˜ki (t) ≤ qk(t) · z˙k−i (t) + ∆(18),
where ∆(18) denotes the difference between the right- and the left-hand sides
of inequality (18). Fortunately, equation (17) enables us to reduce the last
budget constraint to the following more familiar one (in net trades):
qk(t) · z˙ki (t) ≤ 0 for k = A,B. (19)
4.5 A local random Quantity Theory of Money
Summing (18) over i, and using (12) yields the following (localized) version
of Fisher’s celebrated quantity theory of money, for every k:
µk(t) +Mk(t) ≥ qk(t) ·
(∑
i
z˙k+i (t)
)
, (20)
Provided trades are effective —that is:
∑
i z˙
k+
i (t) 6= 0—, and if a.e. consumer
i verifies (18) as an equality, then (20) holds as an equality.49 Notice that,
in (20), “income” corresponds to the current value (at market prices) of
infinitesimal trades, and not to initial endowments. Moreover, at variance
with the textbook analysis of Fisher’s equation, and apart from the quantity
Mk(·) of inside money, (20) only involves endogeneous random variables:
infinitesimal trades z˙k(t), as well as prices q(t) and available cash µk(·) in
k-currency are all determined endogenously along a trade path. Being stated
in the tangent bundle of τ , our quantity theory of money involves only flows
(and no stock). Finally, the “velocity of money” is variable, and always
greater than, or equal to, 1 in our theory. It equals 1 whenever (20) is
47z+ := z ∨ 0. Again, (18) presupposes that the FX market as well as the loan market
for each Central Bank open “before” the security markets.
48z− := (−z)∧ 0. Here, 1 + rk(t) stands for the first-order, linear approximation (in the
tangent market Tγ(t)E) of the cost erk(t)m˜ki (t).
49When no-trade prevails within country k, prices are indeterminate and the qtm breaks
down.
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binding, and can be interpreted asthe ratio between the rate of growth of
circulating money and the rate of growth of the real economy. (Indeed, the
speed of infinitesimal trades on the right hand-side of (20) also characterize
the speed of growth of stocks zki (t) = z
k
i (0) +
∫ t
0
z˙ki (t)dt. Although they
are oviously linked together, the velocity of money should therefore not be
confused with the speed of trades, ||∑i z˙k+i (t)||, which is also endogenously
determined.
4.6 The local interaction of investors
At each time t, the state of the monetary economy E contains both a
“real” and a monetary part: γ(t) := (zk(t), δk(t),mk(t), µk(t),Mk(t))k. The
configuration space, M := τ × (R2L+4+ )4 × R10+ , is the set of feasible states
of our dynamics, i.e., of feasible allocations in assets, savings, and stocks of
money γ = (x, δ,m, µ,M) with
∑
im
k
i = m
k, 0 ≤ δki ≤ zki and 0 ≤ µki ≤ mki ,
for every i, k.
4.6.1 Pseudo-flows
We begin with a generalization of the standard Walrasian equilibrium con-
cept.
Definition.50 A monetary pseudo-flow of Tγ(t)E in (uncertain) state ω is a
price, q(t) = (qA(t), qB(t)) ∈
(
R4+2L+
)2
\ {0}, a feasible 4-tuple of borrowed
money (m˜i(t))i ∈ R4+, and a feasible infinitesimal net trade in assets, z˙(t) ∈(
R4+2L+
)4
, such that:
(i) For every i, q(t) ·∇Vi(zi, ω, t) = 0 implies z˙i(t) = 0. Moreover,
if, for some k, µk(t) > 0, then m˜ki (t) verifies for every i: m˜
k
i (t) =
(µki (t)/µ
k(t))Mk(t).
(ii) For every i, z˙i(t) maximizes z˙i(t) · Vi(x˙) subject to the short-
sale, cash-in-advance and budget constraints, for every k:
z˙k(t) ≥ −δki (t), qk(t) · z˙k(t) ≤ 0, qk(t) · z˙k+(t) ≤ m˜ki (t) + µki (t) (21)
and for every asset c, qkc (t) = 0⇒ z˙i,c(t) = 0 every i.
(iii) For every asset c, qkc (t) = 0 implies that, for every i,
∂Vi(zi(t),ω,t)
∂zi,c(t)
=
0.
If µki (t) = 0 while µ
k(t) > 0, then i has no endowed money and can
no more borrow k-money (because of (17)). Hence, the cash-in-advance
constraint (18) implies that i is excluded from trades in currency k. If, in
50In the parlance of Giraud & Tsomocos (2009) the present definition corresponds to
first-order pseudo-flow. Since, in the setting of this paper, every flow is of first-order, we
skip this distinction.
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addition, µk(t) = 0 but Mk(t) > 0 for both k = A,B, then rA(t) = rB(t) = 0,
the cash-in-advance constraint vanishes and (q, z˙) reduces to a pair of Walras
allocations (in net trades) and price ratios of the linear economy TγE (cf.
section 2 above). The same outcome obtains dually whenever Mk(t) → ∞
while µk > 0, for both k. Then, indeed, rk → 0+ and, at the limit, the
final infinitesimal trades induced by a pseudo-flow are not different from the
Walrasian net trades obtained in TγE in an idealized world without money
at all, where prices only have the meaning of exchange rates between pairs
of commodities. Finally, if µk = Mk = 0, no-trade is the unique outcome in
country k.
Lemma 1.— Under (C), (a) Every monetary tangent market Tγ(t)E
admits a monetary pseudo-flow, and (b) every such pseudo-flow ver-
ifies: qk(t) · z˙ki (t) = 0, a.e. i.
Proof. In order to simplify notations, we drop the time and ω indices.
(a) For every country k, if µk = 0 and Mk = 0, no-trade is the unique
pseudo-flow. If µk = 0 and Mk > 0, a monetary pseudo-flow boils down to a
“pseudo-equilibrium” (in the sense of Mertens (2003)) of TγE , expressed in
net trades. Existence of such pseudo-equilibria follows from Mertens (2003,
Lemma 3). If, now, µk > 0, then all the traders i for whom µki = 0 can be
ignored since z˙ki = 0 (by definition of a pseudo-flow). Consider the restriction
of the linear economy TγE to those individuals i with µki > 0. If, in Definition
1(i), the cash-in-advance constraint qk ·z˙k+ ≤ m˜ki +µki is temporarily omitted,
then the part (qk, z˙k) of a monetary pseudo-flow reduces, once again, to a
“pseudo-equilibrium” in net trades. Such a pseudo-equilibrium is defined up
to a normalization constant λk > 0 of k-prices. It therefore only remains to
check that we can choose λ so that λkqk · z˙k+ ≤ m˜ki +µki is fulfilled for every i.
This is easy since, by construction, m˜ki +µ
k
i > 0 for every i (in the restricted
economy).
(b) According to part (ii) of the definition of a pseudo-flow, qc = 0 ⇒
z˙i,c = 0. Thus, we can ignore commodities with zero price, i.e., we assume
q >> 0. It then follows from the short-run utility maximization of Def1.(ii)
that q · z˙i = 0. 
The equality qk(t) · z˙ki (t) = 0 means that, along a trade path, an investor
i is never forced to spend more money µki (t) than she initially decided to (for
a.e. time t). Therefore, the ODE satisfied by each i’s stock of k-currency,
mki (·), simplifies to (cf. (16)):
m˙ki (t) = e
rˆk(t)
[
mki (t)− µki (t)
]
+ pikk
′
(t)κk
′
i (t)− µki (t). (22)
Another noticeable consequence concerns international balances of trades.
Here, indeed, the balance of trade surplus of A is given by:
B(A,B, t) :=
∑
i∈B
qA(t) · z˙Ai (t)− piAB(t)
∑
i∈A
qB(t) · z˙Bi (t). (23)
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Lemma 1 therefore implies that B(A,B, t) = 0. In our stylized setting, a
country can never run balance of payment deficits during some time inter-
val.51
4.6.2 Monetary flows
Definition. A monetary flow (q, z˙) of Tγ(t)E is defined as follows:
(a) As for the asset flow, z˙, one applies “Mertens’ algorithm”:52
Select any pseudo-flow (q, z˙), next start again with the truncated
economy restricted to zero-price assets {c : qc = 0}, as long as
this set is non-empty. Since there are finitely many assets, the
algorithm must end.
(b) As for prices, for each country k, fix them in the unit sphere,
and choose the largest gauge parameter, 0 < λk ≤ 1, such that
each individual i still verifies her cash-in-advance constraint with
respect to λkqk: λkqk(t) · z˙k+(t) ≤ m˜ki (t) + µki (t).
Part (b) of the Definition is consistent with everyday practice of clearing
houses consisting in maximizing the value of trades.
Lemma 2.— Regardless of the partition of commodities chosen
at every step, Mertens’ algorithm produces the same final asset
flow z˙. Unless z˙ = 0 or µ = 0, the corresponding price q > 0 is
unique.
It is worth noticing that, when z˙ = 0, Mertens’ algorithm may end up with
various price ratios, while, when µk = 0 and Mk > 0, the players’ amounts
of borrowed money, m˜ki ≥ 0 and the price normalization factor λk > 0 may
take various values compatible with
∑
i m˜
k
i = M
k and λkqk · z˙k+ ≤ m˜ki .
Let Z(Tγ(t)E) denote the unique asset flow of the monetary tangent mar-
ket Tγ(t)E , and Q(Tγ(t)E) the set of associated prices. Given some initial
conditions at time 0, our dynamics is defined by the pair of equations:
z˙(t) = Z(Tγ(t)E) and q(t) ∈ Q(Tγ(t)E). (24)
Proposition 3.— Under (C), (24) admits a random trade path
and price curve.
Proof. The proof mimics that of Proposition 1 above. The normalization
of prices in the unit ball provides the needed upper-bound on prices. 
51See nevertheless section 4.2 below.
52See section VIII.A.Def. 5 in Mertens (2003).
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5 An optimal random growth of national cur-
rencies
We now prove that, for the conclusion of Theorem 1 to hold in our mon-
etary set-up, this requires national currencies to grow at a minimal speed.
Since, above this speed a further acceleration would have no real impact but
produces inflation alone (because of the local Quantity Theory of Money),
this provides an optimal (random) growth of currencies.
5.1 Monetary local gains-to-trade
The monetary multi-national version of χ(·) (cf. section 3.2 supra) goes as
follows: (i) If µk > 0 for some k, then consider the linear economy obtained by
ignoring, in TγE , those traders i with µki = 0. Denote by χ∗k(δ) the measure
applied on the short-sale constraints of those traders (of both countries) who
are positively endowed with k-money. k-monetary local gains-to-trade are
then defined as: χk(z) := χ∗k(δ).53 (ii) If µk = 0, then χk(z) := χk(δ).
The next Lemma is the key result for Theorem 2 to follow, but is also
interesting in its own right. Its proof is in the Appendix.
Lemma 3.—Under (C), (i) for every trade path ϕ(·), if it verifies
ϕ˙k(t) = 0, then one of the following must be true:
(a) Either χk(z(t)) = 0,
(b) or rk(t) > χk(z(t)) for both k = 1, 2,
(c) else, δk(t) = 0.
(ii) If rk(t) > χk(z(t)) for both k = 1, 2, the unique monetary flow
is no-trade.
The previous Lemma tells us under which conditions no trade will occur
on a tangent market. Three situations may be identified: Either (a) investors
do not believe that there are gains to trade –that is, the current allocation
of assets put on the market as a result of agents’ expectations is already
Pareto-optimal. Or (b) the cost of borrowing inside money is too heavy in
comparison with current gains-to-trade as envisaged by agents –i.e., the cash-
in-advance constraint prevents from trading agents who, otherwise, would be
willing to do so. Else (c), investors are so pessimistic that they refuse to
trade and save all their assets. Lemma 1 (ii) provides a partial converse: If
the current k-interest rate is above the threshold provided by current gains-
to-trade (given households’ savings), then no-trade in k-currency must occur.
53They are said to be local because they only depend upon the local geometry of house-
holds’preferences. Notice, however, that χk(z) embraces the world virtual trade oppor-
tunities and is not country-specific but currency-specific. (Remember that a citizen of
country A may possess B-currency as well as assets issued in country B.
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5.1.1 Convergence with money
We are now ready to state the central result of this paper. Its proof is
given in the Appendix.
Theorem 2.—Under (C) and (B), for every feasible initial state
z(0) >> 0,
(i) Suppose that the two following conditions are satisfied:
(a) Expectations are such that, for every i, k, zki,j(t) >
0⇒ δki,c(t) > 0 for every asset c, and almost every t;
(b) For every k = 1, 2, t 7→ Mk(t) grows sufficiently
rapidly, so that:
Mk(φtω) ≥ µ
k(t)
χ(z(t))
(φtω), a.e. t, ∀ω, (25)
then the conclusion of Theorem 1 obtains, i.e., every trade curve
converges in probability to some approximately constrained interim
efficient allocation for T large enough.
(ii) On the contrary, if the length of time where markets in country
k are not liquid enough verifies:54
λ
[{
t : χk(z(t)) <
µk(t)
Mk(t)
= rk(t)
}
∩ {t : µk(t) > 0}] > 0,
(26)
then, at some time t∗, the flow of Tγ(z(t∗))E coincides with no-trade,
and the state will rest on z(t∗) as long as the ratio of inside to outside
money does not increase sufficiently so as to verify (25) for a subset
of time t ≥ t∗ of positive measure.
Remark 6. The condition χk(z(t)) < rk(t) will open a liquidity trap in
country k only whenever, at the same time, µk(t) > 0. Otherwise, we know
indeed that the monetary flow degenerates to some Walras equilibrium which
becomes independent from the monetary sector. Equation (25) provides an
optimal random growth rate of money that need be verified by each of the
two countries if we want markets to function properly. Notice that if country
A is experiencing a “black-out”, the markets of B may still remain alive.
This result provides us with an optimal random rate of growth for in-
side money. Unlike Friedman’s famous “Golden rule”, this rate depends on
households’ expectations but also on the real fundamentals of the economy.
Notice, in particular, that each country’s optimal rate depends on the real
54Here, λ(·) is the Lebesgue measure.
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parameters of the whole world economy. Theorem 2 also shows that cur-
rencies are not neutral, neither in the long-, nor in the short-run. In the
short-run, because when an country is trapped in a liquidity hole, a sup-
plementary injection of inside money can induce new (infinitesimal) trades
(provided it suffices to reduce the intraperiod k-interest rate, rk(t), below the
local gains-to-trade). In the long-run, because an increase of inside k-money
from Mk(t) to Mk(t) + ε at some time t will have an impact, at least later
on (say, at time τ > t), whenever local gains-to-trade will have sufficiently
diminished in order to fall below µk(t)/Mk(t). At this time, without the
additional increment ε, the economy would have been stuck in some liquid-
ity trap. Thanks to ε, this event is postponed. Since Mk(t) must grow to
infinity for Θ to be eventually reached, this time τ will come sooner or later
(provided T is sufficiently large) — which proves that the increment ε has an
impact in the long-run. This non-neutrality property, however, should not
be confused withy money-illusion: One readily sees from the definition of a
monetary pseudo-flow that a proportional increase of mki (t), for all i, and
Mk(t) does not affect trade paths. And it has no effect on prices apart from
the obvious rescaling. That is, if EU switches from Euros to cents while Eng-
land sticks to pounds and the U.S.A. to dollars, then only European prices
and Euro exchange rates will change.
5.2 Comparative advantages
As a Classical economist, Ricardo adhered to the labor theory of value.
As a result, he used labor hours contained in one unit of a good as a mea-
sure of cost, and calculated comparative cost accordingly. Hecksher, Ohlin
and Samuelson55 then provided a rewriting of this theory in terms of fac-
tor proportions. In our pure-exchange setting, these standard ideas can be
reconsidered by replacing ratios of factor proportions or labour hours with
marginal rates of utility substitution. Consider the following textbook ex-
ample:
Cheese (1 pound) Wine (1 gallon)
Country A 2 gallon wine 0.5 pound cheese
Country B 1.25 gallon wine 0.8 pound cheese
It can be translated into our set-up by considering a linear world economy
with two commodities, no financial security, where country A is populated
by a single representative household uA(x, y) := 2x + y, while citizens in
country B are also identical: uB(x, y) := 1.25x+y (x stands for cheese and y
for wine). Traditional wisdom asserts that A should sell some gallons of wine
to country B for extra cheese whereas country B sells cheese to country A for
extra wine. In the barter version of this paper (section 2), this is obviously
confirmed (although it may be that, due to the linearity of preferences, B
55Cf. Ohlin (1933) and Stolper & Samuelson (1941).
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does not gain — nor does it loose— anything from opening its frontiers to
A). Does this story hold water within our monetary transition to equilibrium
with heterogenous agents ?
Suppose that agent i exchanges κA(t) + ε A-money for B-money in order
to deposit ε > 0 on the B-interperiod loan market instead of using it on
B-commodity markets. Then, according to (12), the floating exchange rate
will adjust to:
p˜iBA(t) =
κB(t)
κA(t) + ε
:= piBA(t)− η.
Each individual’s h budget constraint in B-money (19) will stay unchanged,
but combining the last equation with (14) and (17), her cash-in-advance
constraint in B-money (18) becomes:
qB(t) · z˙B+h (t) ≤ µBh (t) + (piBA(t)− η)κAh (t)− κBh (t) + m˜Bh (t)− η
κAh (t)
rB(t)
,
provided rB(t) > 0. For η sufficiently large (or rB(t) sufficiently small), this
implies that the cash-in-advance contraint will prevent from trading in B-
currency any agent h for whom κAh (t) > 0. In particular, for A-citizens, κ
A
h (t)
is very likely to be positive, so that these consumers won’t be able to trade
in B-money. Therefore, international movements of capital may challenge
the traditional conclusion of “comparative advantages”.
Prima facie, this is not related to any trade imbalance since, as already
seen, countries always have a zero balance of (net) trade surplus. A little
reflection, however, suggests that this is due to the failure of our definition
(23) to capture what is going on. One might suspect, indeed, that whenever
speculative capital movements occur, the balance of trade surplus of country
A with respect to country B at time t should be nonzero.56 This conclusion
would obtain by defining A’s balance of trade surplus slighlty differently:
B(A,B, t) :=
∑
i∈B
qA(t) · z˙+Ai (t)− piAB(t)
∑
i∈A
qB(t) · z˙+Bi (t). (27)
With such a definition in hand, a country may run a balance of trade deficit
(or a surplus). If an agent exchanges ε units of her domestic currency A
for B-money, and does spend this additional B-money at time t, this will
raise the A-balance of trade surplus as defined by (27). Contrary to the
finite-horizon setting of Geanakoplos & Tsomocos (2006), here there is no
terminal date from which a backward induction argument would enable to
deduce that a balance of trade deficit today must result into a balance of
trade surplus in the future.
The analysis conducted in this paper could be runned without assum-
ing that no consumer exchanges money on the FX-market for speculative
56As it is the case in Geanakoplos & Tsomocos (2006).
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purposes, as we did so far through equation (13). As already alluded to,
this would lead to a more complicated cash-in-advance constraint. Hence,
additional restrictions on the exchange rate, piAB(·), would be needed for
Theorem 2, in order to ensure that no currency is artificially overvalued at
the price of making trades in this currency too costly for foreigners.
6 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
Not surprisingly, the proof consists in extending Lyapounov’s second
method to our set-valued random dynamical system set-up. We follow Arnold
& Schmalfuss (2001). Let A be a ϕ-invariant random set. V : Ω×R16+8L →
R+ is a Lyapounov function for A under ϕ if:
(i) V(·, z) is measurable ∀z ∈ R16+8L, and V(ω, ·) is continuous
∀ω ∈ Ω.
(ii) V is uniformly unbounded, i.e., lim||z||→∞ V(ω, z) = +∞ ∀ω.
(iii) V(ω, z) = 0 for z ∈ A(ω) and V(ω, z) > 0 for z /∈ A(ω).
(iv) V is strictly decreasing along orbits of ϕ not in A:
V(φtω, ϕ(t, ω, z)) < V(ω, z),∀t ∈ (0, T ], z /∈ A(ω).
Lemma 0. Under (C), V(ω, ϕ(t, ω, z)) := −∑i∇zVi(ω, ϕ(t, ω, z)) · z˙i(t),
is a Lyapounov function for Θ under ϕ.
Proof. Properties (i) and (ii) are obvious. (iii) and (iv) follow from an
ω-adaptation of Lemma 2 in Champsaur & Cornet (1990), which states that,
under (C): ∑
i
∇zVi(ω, ϕ(t, ω, z)) · z˙i(t) = 0 if z ∈ Θ,
> 0 otherwise.
Indeed, let (z˙, q) be a Walras equilibrium of TzE . From the duality theorem,
one gets, for every i (with obvious notational simplifications):
0 = ∇kVi(zi) · z˙i
= −∇kVi(zi) · zi + q · zi max
{∇kVi(zi)
qk
| for any asset k
}
.
Consequently,
qk ≥
[ q · zi
∇kVi(zi) · zi
]
∇ki Vi(zi)
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for every i and any asset k such that ∇kVi(zi) ·zi > 0. But, as preferences are
strictly monotone, the boundary condition on utilities and the fact that asset
returns are positive ensure that this latter condition is verified. It remains
to check that the above inequalities are in fact equalities for each asset k
such that zki > 0. Suppose the contrary for some pair (i, k), multiply each
inequality by zki , and sum over i in order to get a contradiction.
Assumption (B) then ensures that Θ is ϕ-invariant since ϕΘ =IdΘ.

Theorem 1 then follows from Theorem 6.5 in Arnold & Schmalfuss (2001)).
Its Corollary follows from Proposition 4.4 (loc. cit.).
Incidentally, Lemma 0 implies the following Proposition, which shows that
when shifting from exact optimality to approximate optimality, (B) implies
the intuitive Bayesian dynamical consistency.57
Proposition 0.— Under (C) and (B), for any ε > 0, the set
Cε := cl
{
z ∈ τ | V(ω, z) < ε}
is a forward invariant compact random set.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 6.3. (i) in Arnold & Schmalfuss (2001)
that the auxiliary set
Dε := cl
{
z | V(ω, z) < ε}
is forward invariant with respect to φ. Since τ is also random compact,
so is Cε = τ ∩ Dε. For z ∈ Cε(ω), we have 0 ≤ V(ω, z) < ε, hence 0 ≤
V(φtω, ϕ(t, ω, z)) < ε for any t ∈ (0, T ] by property (iv) of a Lyapounov
function. This says that V−1(φtω, [0, ε)) ⊂intCε(φtω) for any t ∈ (0, T ].

In words: When gains to trade are small interim, the onfolding of infor-
mation per se does not increase them.
Proof of Lemma 2.
(i) Suppose that, in country k, γk(x, ω, t) ≥ rk(ω, t) ≥ 0, and that nev-
ertheless the monetary flow of Tγ(t)E involves no-trade. Then, for every
household i, the cash-in-advance constraint in k-currency qk(t) · z˙k+i (t) ≤
m˜ki (t) + mu
k
i (t) is trivially satisfied, whatever being people’s initial endow-
ment in money as well as the factor λk(t) > 0 chosen by the clearing house in
order to fix the price level in country k. Imagine therefore that the k-clearing
house commits to set λk(t) > 0 and let λk(t) → +∞. Since, at a monetary
flow, qk(t) >> 0 by definition, this means that qkλ(t) := λ
k(t)qk(t)
||qk(t)|| → +∞ as
well. As a consequence, the purchasing power of the endowed k-money mki (t)
as well as that of the k′-money κki (t) ≤ mk′i (t) that i may wish to change into
k, both go to zero and may be ignored. At the limit, the trading opportunity
57clX designates the topological closure of X.
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on k-assets for any household is to purchase assets solely out of the borrowed
money and to pay back the loan, m˜ki (t), at the intraperiod interest rate r
k(t),
out of her sales revenues – conducting all infinitesimal trades in k-assets at
the limiting price ratios obtained as λk(t)→∞. To be more precise, consider
qk∗(t) given by:58
qk∗(t)c := lim
λk(t)→∞
qkλc (t)∑
d∈k q
kλ
d
, every asset c,
and let us denote by Bi(q
kλ(t), µkλ(t), rk(t)), the budget set of agent i defined
by those infinitesimal k-trades z˙ki (t) ≥ −δki (t) such that the cash-in-advance
and the no-default constraint (21) are satisfied. As shown by Lemma 3
in Giraud & Tsomocos (2009), this is equivalent to the non-linear budget
constraint:
qkλ(t) · z˙k+i (t) +
1
1 + rk(t)
qkλ(t) · z˙k−i (t) ≤ µki (t).
The budget set being therefore homogeneous with respect to (qkλ, µk)(t), one
has:
Bi(q
kλ(t), µkλ(t), rk(t)) = Bi
( qkλ(t)
|qkλ(t)|` 1
,
µk(t)
|qkλ(t)|` 1
, rk(t)
)
where |qkλ(t)|` 1 :=
∑
c∈k q
kλ
c (t). For any ω, as λ
k(t) → ∞, one has the
set convergence (e.g., for the Hausdorff metric) of this budget set towards
Bi(q
k∗(t), 0, rk(t)). If, now, given, z˙k
′
i (t), z˙
k
i is∇kVi(zi(t))-optimal inBi
(
qkλ(t)
|qkλ(t)|`
1
, µ
k(t)
|qkλ(t)|`
1
, rk(t)
)
,
its limit, z˙ki → 0, must be ∇kVi(zi)-optimal in Bi(qk∗(t), 0, rk(t)). (This ar-
gument is possible because each agent faces two separate budget- and cash-
in-advance constraints for each currency.) In the same way as in Theorem
2 of Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003a), this is tantamount to performing stan-
dard Walrasian trades in k-assets at qk∗(t) but consuming only the fraction
1/(1 + rk(t)) of purchases. In turn, a change of variable shows that this may
be viewed as performing the whole Walrasian net trades via modified utilities
v
rk(t)
i (·) defined as follows:
v
rk(t)
i (z˙
k
i (t)) := ∇kVi(zi) ·
(
z˙k
′
i (t), z˙
k
i (r
k(t))
)
,
where z˙ki (r
k(t)) is defined as in (9). Thus, no-trade is a Walras allocation in
k-assets for the whole world population (v
rk(t)
i )i at k-prices q
k∗(t), and must
be Pareto-optimal (in the short-run, i.e., with respect to infinitesimal reallo-
cations within the tangent market Tγ(t)E) wrt (vr
k(t)
i )i. Since r
k(t) ≤ χk(z(t)),
0 is also Pareto optimal in the short-run with respect to (v
γk(z(t))
i )i. But we
know from Lemma 2 in Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003a) that there are no local
gains to χk(z(t))-diminished k-trades in Tγ(t)E if, and only if, the (concave
58The sum in the denominator is taken over all the k-assets.
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but non-linear) economy (v
χk(z(t))
i )i has a no-trade Walras equilibrium. This
contradicts the gains-to-trade hypothesis χk(x) > 0. So, no-trade cannot be
a monetary flow of Tγ(t)E .
(ii) is a direct consequence of Theorem 6 in Dubey & Geanakoplos (2003a).
There, it is proven that, under the stated condition, no individual can have
effective trades since she could then be able to improve her short-run welfare
by slightly perturbing her trades. The same argument shows, here, that the
unique monetary flow must be no-trade. Details are left to the reader. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Lemma 2 enables to prove, again, that V(·), as
defined in Lemma 0 supra, is still a random Lyapounov function. Theorem
2 then follows from Theorem 1. 
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